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HEY, BIG SPENDER: Ethical Guidelines for
Dispute Resolution Professionals when
Parties Are Backed by Third-Party Funders
Elayne E. Greenberg*
A man without ethics is like a wild beast loosed upon this world.
— Albert Camus
INTRODUCTION
This first-of-its-kind paper introduces ethical guidelines and suggested
practices for dispute resolution providers and neutrals when third-party
funders provide financial backing for parties in U.S. domestic arbitrations
and mediations.1 Sophisticated third-party funders have realized that
litigation and dispute resolution are fast-growing, unregulated investment
opportunities.2 Seizing these opportunities, third-party funders are now
* Professor Elayne E. Greenberg is Assistant Dean of Dispute Resolution, Director of the
Hugh L. Carey Center for Dispute Resolution and Professor of Legal Practice at St. John’s
University School of Law. Thank you Dean Simons and my St. John’s colleagues for your
encouragement. My colleagues at the AALS Alternative Dispute Resolution Section Works-inProgress Conference that was held at Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law at Arizona State
(October 20, 21 2018) raised questions that strengthened this paper. My gratitude to Victoria
Shannon Sahani for her astute review of the final draft. My appreciation to Nicholas DiMarco (St.
Johns Law ’19), my skilled research assistant, for his helpful comments and astute edits on this
draft.
1.
See LISA BENCH NIEUWVELD & VICTORIA SHANNON SAHANI, THIRD-PARTY FUNDING IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 129–74 (Wolters Kluwer 2d ed. 2017); Memorandum from Patrick
A. Tighe, Rules Law Clerk to Ed Cooper et al. (Feb. 7, 2018), in ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL
RULES, AGENDA BOOK 209, 215 (2018), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04civil-rules-agenda-book.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9EB-QL3B]. Domestically, states have taken an
inconsistent approach regarding third-party funding as evidence by states’ statutes, case law and
rules. Those states that have adopted any rules and regulations focus on disclosure in litigation
and the boundaries of permissible funding arrangements. None of these rules and regulations
address the ethical issues for dispute resolution providers and neutrals that arise when a party is
receiving third-party funding.
2.
See John Breslin, Funding Litigation a Billion-Dollar Business, LEGAL NEWSLINE
(Aug. 30, 2017), http://legalnewsline.com/stories/511198462-funding-litigation-a-billion-dollarbusiness [https://perma.cc/6XZH-GHJT]; Vanessa O’Connell, Funds Spring Up to Invest in
ST.
J.
(Oct.
3,
2011),
High-Stakes
Litigation,
WALL
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204226204576598842318233996
[https://perma.cc/69VW-ATNM].
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making billions of dollars in profits through their strategic investments in
domestic and global litigation and dispute resolution with few ethical rules or
regulations to curtail their investment behavior.3 Preferring to be secretive
about the terms of their funding contracts and invisible in their work, thirdparty funders are flourishing, in large part, by operating below the regulatory
radar.4 The funders’ behavior has been allowed to proceed invisible and
unchecked because courts and dispute resolution providers and neutrals are
too often unaware that a party is even receiving third-party funding. Such
unawareness, however, presents a potential ethical minefield, not just for
judges and litigators, but also for dispute resolution providers and neutrals.
A discordant chorus of courts,5 business gurus6 and legal scholars, slowly
becoming aware of the potential ethical conflicts, have begun to voice
3.
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 1; see also Matthew Andrews, The Growth of
Litigation Finance in DOJ Whistleblower Suits: Implications and Recommendations, 123 YALE
L.J. 2422, 2428–29 (2014) (discussing how litigation funding is a lucrative, growing industry that
invests in a range of cases including personal injury, employment discrimination, intellectual
property, and other commercial disputes); GEOFFREY MCGOVERN ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL
JUSTICE, THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING AND CLAIM TRANSFER: TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 12 (2010), https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/
CF272.html [https://perma.cc/QA2Z-J7U7] (reporting that third-party funding is a multibillion
dollar industry).
4.
See NIEUWVELD & SAHANI, supra note 1, at 159–73 (indicating a growing minority of
states that have statutes requiring disclosure in the litigation context); see, e.g., Maya Steinitz,
Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1277–78
(2011) (“In international arbitrations, the reason for this expansion [of third-party funding] is
partly a de facto absence of professional regulations that enables funders and attorneys to operate
outside of the disciplinary reach of bar associations.”).
5.
Compare Alison Frankel, New York’s Top Court Clamps Down on Shoestring Litigation
Funders, REUTERS (Oct. 28, 2016, 1:50 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-frankellitigation/new-yorks-top-court-clamps-down-on-shoestring-litigation-fundersidUSKCN12S2M3 [https://perma.cc/36TD-APAL] (describing recent N.Y. Court of Appeals
decision that expanded the reach of champerty), and Kevin LaCroix, Courts Throw Some Shade
at Litigation Funding Arrangements, D&O DIARY (Oct. 9, 2016), http://www.dandodiary.com/
2016/10/articles/litigation-%20financing-2/courts-throw-shade-litigation-funding-arrangements/
[https://perma.cc/CA9H-H46P] (describing cases in which funding arrangements were recently
nullified in both Pennsylvania and Delaware), with Digging Didn’t Help—Court Decision
Supports Commercial Litigation Funding, BENTHAM IMF (Feb. 12, 2014),
http://www.benthamimf.com/blog/blog-full-post/bentham-imf-blog/2014/02/12/digging-didn'thelp---court-decision-supports-commercial-litigation-funding [https://perma.cc/8EWV-QMEP]
(describing recent decision in the Northern District of Illinois that held confidential
communications between party and funder were protected by work product doctrine).
6.
See Alison Frankel, Business Lobby Calls for Federal Rules to Require Litigation
Funding Disclosure, REUTERS (June 2, 2017, 11:55 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-otcfunding-idUSKBN18T2QR [https://perma.cc/UT2R-RJE7]. More than two dozen business
groups including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce are advocating that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure be modified to require parties to disclose if they are backed by third-party funders.
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concerns that third-party funders may be traversing proscribed ethical
boundaries involving the practice of law. This growing group is calling for
greater visibility, transparency and ethical scrutiny of third-party funding
practice in litigation. Of course, when parties disagree, courts are the final
arbiter of whether or not the practice of third-party funding is even legal.7
However, once courts resolve the threshold issue of legality, there is growing
support among the judiciary and legal community to require litigants to
disclose if they are receiving economic support by a third-party funder.8
Without such mandatory disclosure our legal system is unable to address the
real and potential ethical concerns about how third-party funders are
adversely affecting the attorney-client relationship, controlling settlement,
and potentially posing conflicts of interest with all involved in the case.
Until now, such heated discourse in the United States about the ethics of
third-party funders has focused primarily on the ethics of third-party funding
in litigation, while only cursorily addressing the ethical issues of third-party
funders in U.S. domestic arbitration, a quasi-litigation procedure.9 Even more
curious, the ethics of third-party funders in mediation, a party-directed
procedure, has been conspicuously absent from the conversation. Since the
lion’s share of legal cases are resolved by dispute resolution settlement rather
than court judgment,10 it makes more sense that any discussion about the
7.
See AM. BAR ASSOC. COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, INFORMATIONAL REPORT TO THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES 1 (2012), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
ethics_2020/20111212_ethics_20_20_alf_white_paper_final_hod_informational_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RS55-PQK4] [hereinafter ABA 20/20 REPORT].
8.
See Dorothy Murray & Edmund Northcott, Thoughts on Disclosure of Third Party
(June
20,
2017),
https://www.lexology.com/library/
Funding,
LEXOLOGY
detail.aspx?g=d01612dd-5a78-4f8a-ae6c-22ba3c064630 [https://perma.cc/VUA6-NVM4]; Jason
D. Russell & Hillary A. Hamilton, Third-Party Litigation Financing: Mandatory Disclosure on
the Horizon?, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES (Apr. 19, 2017),
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2017/04/thirdparty-litigation-financingmandatory-discl (“Recent developments indicate that courts, rule committees and even Congress
may be leaning toward mandatory disclosure of third-party litigation funding in civil litigation.”).
But see Sam Reisman, Critics Pushing Back on 3rd-Party Funding Disclosure Rule, LAW360
(June 21, 2017, 7:08 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/935786/critics-pushing-back-on3rd- party-funding-disclosure-rule [https://perma.cc/WW6H-XWXZ].
9.
Our global brethren, however, have addressed the ethics of third-party funding in the
context of international arbitration. This is discussed later in the section. See generally INT’L
COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, REPORT OF THE ICCA-QUEEN MARY TASK FORCE ON
THIRD-PARTY FUNDING IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2018), http://www.arbitrationicca.org/media/10/40280243154551/icca_reports_4_tpf_final_for_print_5_april.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A27G-P34A] [hereinafter ICCA REPORT]
10. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters
in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 461 (2004); Patricia Lee Refo,
Winter
2004,
at
2
(2004),
The
Vanishing
Trial,
30
LITIG.,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/litigation_journal/04winter_openingst
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ethical conduct of third-party funders should address the ethical conduct of
third-party funders in those dispute resolution procedures that help promote
settlement. The presence of a third-party funder in a dispute resolution
procedure may collide with the ethical obligations of dispute resolution
providers and neutrals, unless affirmative steps are taken to avoid the
collision.11 This paper fills in that information gap, expands the evolving
discussion about the ethics of third-party funding, and refocuses on providing
ethical guidance for dispute resolution providers and neutrals when litigation
funders back parties in arbitration and mediation.
Our global brethren, who have long embraced litigation funding as an
economic necessity to fund the escalating costs of litigation, have also begun
to heed this warning and promulgate ethical rules to guide third-party
funders’ behavior in dispute resolution.12 Globally, there are now legislative
and regulatory initiatives that require greater transparency when litigation
funders are providing financial backing for parties in international arbitration
and mediation.13 In the United States, however, there is ambivalence about
the legitimacy of litigation funding.14 This paper is the first proposal for
coordinated ethical guidelines for alternative dispute resolution providers and
neutrals to follow when third-party funders are backing parties in domestic
arbitration and mediations.
In order to develop responsive ethical guidelines for working with thirdparty funders in dispute resolution, we must first grasp the complexities and
nuances of third-party funders, and this paper provides that context. Part I
chronicles the evolutionary role of third-party funders. It explains who thirdparty funders are, why they were once prohibited, and the many permutations
in which they now exist. Part II provides an overview of two global initiatives
that provide ethical guidance when litigation funders are backing parties in a
dispute resolution procedure. Even though global legal regimes present
different ethical challenges, it is instructive to take the international pulse on
this emerging issue and see which ideas can be transported to the United
States.
In Part III, the discussion focuses on the U.S. response to third-party
funders by highlighting notable court decisions, the American Bar
Association’s Commission on Ethics 20/20 report, and public interest
research on this emerging topic. Part III helps identify the U.S. areas of
atement.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9X6-QXGX] (stating that approximately 1.8% of
federal cases were actually decided by an adjudicated decision).
11. See Victoria Shannon Sahani, Reshaping Third-Party Funding, 91 TUL. L. REV. 405,
426–28 (2017).
12. See generally ICCA REPORT, supra note 9.
13. See generally id.
14. See NIEUWVELD & SAHANI, supra note 1, at 157.
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agreement and concern that need to be incorporated into any ethical
guidelines and best practices for dispute resolution providers and neutrals.
Part IV outlines suggested ethical guidelines and best practices for dispute
resolution providers, arbitrators, and mediators to follow when parties are
receiving third-party funding. This discussion concludes by recognizing that
this paper is an overdue acknowledgment that third-party funders are backing
parties in dispute resolution procedures and a recognition that additional
ethical issues will emerge. The reader is left with additional questions that
the dispute resolution community may want to consider as third-party funders
continue to play an evolving role in dispute resolution.
I.

THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THIRD-PARTY FUNDERS

The narrative about how third-party funding has evolved from a
proscribed practice to an economic reality sheds light on the vestiges of
concern about third-party funders that persist today. It also provides a
historical context for readers to better understand the ethical concerns that
should be addressed when third-party funders are backing a party in a dispute
resolution mechanism.
Historically, legal systems have had a long-standing antagonism towards
those third parties who try to inject themselves into the litigation of others. In
large part, courts believed that adjudication should involve only the litigants
and the judge, and courts feared that those outsiders who attempt to inject
themselves in these legal proceedings do so solely because they have a
nefarious purpose that would subvert the integrity of the justice system.15
Such a hostile intrusion was considered harmful to both the individual
litigants and the system as a whole. As you will read, that fear was founded.
In legal systems dating back from ancient Greek and then Roman times, there
was a commitment to safeguard justice by barring any outsider who
attempted to inject himself between the litigants and the judge.16 These
outsiders took different forms. In the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., there
were political clubs, known as sycophants, who would ban together and
15. See Marc DeGirolami, On the Intellectual Origins of the Crime of Barratry, MIRROR
JUST. (Nov. 18, 2010), https://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2010/11/on-theintellectual-origins-of-the-crime-of-barratry.html [https://perma.cc/9BNJ-NAW7] (describing
how champerty harmed the individual client and the legal system as a whole).
16. Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 50 (1935). There was a
recognized primacy in the relationship between the litigants and the judge. Id. The litigant spoke
directly to the judge. Id. Family and friends were encouraged to attend the court proceedings only
as providers of moral support for the litigant. Id. It was considered a “serious fraud on the court”
if a stranger attended, pretending to be a friend of the litigant. Id.
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provoke litigation against their political adversaries.17 Similar to the Greek
sycophant, Romans had the calumniator—those who commenced baseless
litigation for the sole purpose of agitating the government.18
This suspicion towards the intervention of outsiders to litigation continued
into the Middle Ages and was codified into both the common law and old
English statutes.19 Barratry, champerty and maintenance are the codifications
of three categories of proscribed interference into the legal system.20 Barratry
described the offense of those agitators who would provoke legal disputes.21
Maintenance is the general term used to describe when an outsider to the
litigation advances money to support an ongoing litigation without receiving
a portion of the outcome.22 Champerty, a type of maintenance, refers to an
outsider to the litigation who advances money to support litigation with the
understanding that he will receive in return for his contribution, a profit or
portion of the proceeds.23
Over time, as legal systems strengthened their due process procedures to
address these concerns, courts, in their wisdom, also began to realize that not
all outsiders to litigation were a nefarious group, and that some outsiders even
helped advance justice. Thus, a more nuanced approach to outsiders was
warranted. In 1886, Judge Thayer in the Dahms v. Sears case opined that
“[m]any of the evils which the law was intended to remedy have been
overcome by countervailing circumstances that have arisen, and, in effect,
have been extinguished.”24 With this more nuanced perspective, for example,
it was recognized that maintenance could be re-characterized as an altruistic
act that promotes social good by providing public interest groups needed
funding to bring forward a worthy claim without the funders getting any
money in return.25 Yet even today, as the following sections illustrate,
domestic and global courts still maintain a cautious approach to third-party
funders. Vestiges of this mistrust continue to be evidenced in our modernday law. Such legal doctrines as unconscionability in contract law, usury in
consumer law and the laws regarding assignment of claims are examples of
17. Id. at 49–51.
18. Id. at 53.
19. See id. at 57–58; see also S.J. Brooks, Champerty and Maintenance in the United States,
3 VA. L. REV. 421, 421–22 (1916).
20. Brooks, supra note 19, at 421.
21. Id. at 423.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 425 (quoting Judge Thayer in Dahms v. Sears, 11 P. 891, 898 (Or. 1886)).
25. Simon Fodden, Barratry, Champerty, Maintenance, Oh My!, SLAW (Sept. 20, 2011),
http://www.slaw.ca/2011/09/20/barratry-champerty-maintenance-oh-my/
[https://perma.cc/G4K2-XV9N].
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continued modern-day vigilance of third-party funders’ actions.26 Fueling this
mistrust in part is the difficulty involved in discerning who is a funder and
whether the funder is conducting himself within the permissible bounds of
the law.
In its most elemental form, third-party funding involves a funding entity
who provides financial support to a litigant in return for a share of the
proceeds from a settlement or judgment.27 However, third-party funders come
in many forms: banks, hedge funds or individuals or entities that provides
funding with the expectation of profits.28 The variations that exist in different
types of third-party funding are determinant in assessing whether the funding
typology is legal and has a permissible business purpose.29 Furthermore, the
characterization of a third-party funder is important, because different
disclosure and ethical obligations attach to each characterization.30
The contract between the funder and the litigant defines the financial
relationship between the funder and the funded party, the funder’s role in the
management of the case, and the allocation of responsibilities between the
funder and funded party. Yet, third-party funders resist disclosing these
contracts, insisting that the contracts are proprietary.31 The third-party
funding contract varies from recourse to nonrecourse agreements.32
Furthermore, there is no one typology of a third-party funder; consequently,
each third-party funding agreement differs in purpose, form and context.33
Even the name “third-party funder” may in many cases be a misnomer,
because the funder, depending on the terms of the contract, is often not an

26. See NIEUWVELD & SAHANI, supra note 1, at 136–37, 143–44.
27. See ABA 20/20 REPORT, supra note 7, at 1; Victoria Shannon Sahani, Judging ThirdParty Funding, 63 UCLA L. REV. 388, 392 (2016).
28. Sahani, supra note 27, at 392; ICCA REPORT, supra note 9, at 50–51.
29. See Victoria A. Shannon, Harmonizing Third-Party Litigation Funding Regulation, 36
CARDOZO L. REV. 861, 877–79 (2015).
30. Id. at 903–04.
31. See Victoria Shannon Sahani, Blurred Lines Between Third-Party Funders and Law
Firms, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Nov. 3, 2016), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/
11/03/blurred-lines-between-third-party-funders-and-law-firms/ [https://perma.cc/E6X8-SXYH]
(citing to an emerging financial relationship in which the third-party funder is playing a more
active role in the case).
32. ABA 20/20 REPORT, supra note 7, at 5–6. Recourse funding requires the funded party
to pay the funder for the cost of money, regardless of whether the party prevails. See id. at 6.
Nonrecourse funding requires the funded party to pay the funder only if the funded party prevails.
Id. at 7.
33. See Sahani, supra note 11, at 411–12; ICCA REPORT, supra note 9, at 47–48.

138

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

actual party to the litigation.34 Therefore, disclosure about the presence of
funders and their contractual relationship with the litigant is relevant to
dispute resolution providers and professionals who will be facilitating the
settlement of the case.35
II.

GLOBAL EXPERIENCE SHAPES ETHICAL RULES AND GUIDELINES

Our global brethren have embraced third-party funding as an economic
necessity to fund the escalating costs of litigation and international dispute
resolution.36 Along with such cumulative experience with third-party funders,
however, comes a heightened awareness about the potential ethical
minefields that may occur when third-party funders participate. This
heightened awareness has served as the global impetus to promulgate ethical
rules and develop best practices for dispute resolution providers and neutrals
that require greater transparency of third-party funders.37 The global
community recognizes that without these defined boundaries, third-party
funders, untethered by rules or regulations,38 will continue to ethically collide
with lawyers, dispute resolution providers and neutrals, whose professional
behaviors are defined by their respective ethical rules of conduct.39 In order
for mediators and arbitrators to follow-through on their ethical mandates
about disclosure of conflicts of interest and impartiality, they must first be

34. This author met with Alan Zimmerman, CEO and Legal Counsel of Law Finance Group,
a funding provider, on June 19, 2017. During our conversation, Mr. Zimmerman noted how the
term “third-party funder” is not an accurate label, because funders are not a party to the litigation.
35. See infra Part IV.
36. See Third Party Funding in International Arbitration, ASHURST (Sept. 4, 2018),
https://www.ashurst.com/en/news-and-insights/legal-updates/quickguide---third-party-fundingin-international-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/DS2P-DNV4] (discussing the approaches to the
legality of third-party funding taken by various jurisdictions, including those that embrace it, such
as Hong Kong and Singapore, and those that have rejected it, such as Ireland); see also ICCA
REPORT, supra note 9, at 17; Arbitration and Mediation Legislation (Third Party Funding)
(Amendment), No. 6, (2017) Cap. 609, A137, § 98 (H.K.).
37. See sources cited supra note 36.
38. See, e.g., THE ASSOCIATION OF LITIGATION FUNDERS OF ENGLAND AND WALES, CODE
OF CONDUCT FOR LITIGATION FUNDERS (Nov. 2011), https://www.judiciary.uk/wpcontent/uploads/JCO/Documents/CJC/Publications/CJC+papers/Code+of+Conduct+for+Litigati
on+Funders+(November+2011).pdf [https://perma.cc/7LVC-TQF2] (providing guidelines for
funders about adequacy of funds and accuracy of promotional literature, including the
requirement that litigation funding agreements (“LFAs”) should include the litigation funder’s
role in settling the case and withdrawing from the funding agreement).
39. CATHERINE A. ROGERS, Gamblers, Loan Sharks, and Third-Party Funders, in ETHICS
IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 177, 182 (2014).
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made aware that a third-party funder with whom they have had previous
commercial transactions is now funding a participant in the current matter.40
This section highlights two global initiatives that are shaping the
participatory boundaries of third-party funders in dispute resolution: the
passage of Hong Kong’s Bill 2016, Arbitration and Mediation Legislation,41
and the ICCA-Queen Mary College of the University of London Task
Force.42 Although each initiative has different purposes, both share common
threads. Both recognize that there needs to be disclosure about third-party
funders in arbitration and mediation, and that failure to have disclosure will
perpetuate ethical violations of dispute resolution tenets. Both recognize
third-party funder is an umbrella term that describes many permeations of
economic support, some legal and others of questionable integrity. And both
initiatives call for greater oversight of third-party funders.
A.

Hong Kong’s Bill 2016, Arbitration and Mediation Legislation

The passage of Hong Kong’s Bill 2016, Arbitration and Mediation
Legislation (Third-Party Funding) (“HK Bill 2016”) on June 14, 2017, is the
first global legislation that affirms the legitimacy of third-party funding in
international dispute resolution.43 This legislation synchronizes Hong Kong’s
Law on third-party funding in international dispute resolution with the
practices of China’s International Dispute Resolution providers by
reaffirming that the common law offenses of maintenance and champerty do
not apply to third-party funding in international dispute resolution.44
Significantly, HK Bill 2016 applies not only to the conduct of third-party
funders in international arbitration, but also in international mediation.45 The
HK Bill 2016 provides in its salient parts directives regarding the regulation
and disclosure of third-party funders participating in arbitration and
mediation.

40. See Sahani, supra note 27, at 401–02.
41. See Cap. 609, A137, § 98.
42. ICCA REPORT, supra note 9.
43. See Bills Committee on Arbitration and Mediation Legislation (Third Party Funding)
(Amendment) Bill 2016, LEGIS. COUNCIL H.K. SPECIAL ADMIN. REGION CHINA,
https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr16-17/english/bc/bc102/general/bc102.htm [https://perma.cc/B6K5BJUT]. See also Cap. 609, A137, § 98E(a). It is important to emphasize that this applies only to
domestic arbitration. Third-party funding is still prohibited in Hong Kong domestic litigation.
44. Cap. 609, A137, § 98K; see also Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration,
supra note 36.
45. Cap. 609, A137, § 98F.
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The law requires that a Code of Practice be developed that provides
“practices and standards” for third-party funders to follow.46 The Code of
Practice is currently in development by the HK government.47 A third-party
funded agreement must be in writing,48 and must also explicitly state the risk
and terms and include:
(i)
the degree of control that third party funders will have in
relation to an arbitration [or mediation];
(ii)
whether, and to what extent, third party funders (or persons
associated with the third party funders) will be liable to funded
parties for adverse costs, insurance premiums, security for costs and
other financial liabilities; and
(iii)
when, and on what basis, parties to funding agreements may
terminate the funding agreements or third party funders may
withhold arbitration funding.49

HK Bill 2016 also provides additional mandates that should be included
in the Code of Practice for third-party funders to ensure ethical practice. For
example, prior to a party entering into a third-party funding agreement, thirdparty funders should advise potential funded parties to consult with
independent legal counselors before entering into the third-party funding
agreement.50 Third-party funders are required to have a “sufficient minimum
amount of capital.”51 Moreover, third-party funders are required to have in
place procedures to respond to “potential, actual or perceived conflicts of
interest,”52 and when complaints do arise, “effective procedures” and
“meaningful remedies” to address those complaints.53
In large part, Hong Kong enacted this groundbreaking legislation to
reinforce Hong Kong’s stature as a leading center for international dispute
resolution in the Asia-Pacific region.54 The impact of this legislation is not
limited to China, but rather establishes regulation and disclosure standards
46. Id. § 98P.
47. Joseph Chung, Draft Code of Practice for Third Party Funding of Arbitration and
(Oct.
26,
2018),
https://www.deacons.com.hk/news-andMediation,
DEACONS
insights/publications/draft-code-of-practice-for-third-party-funding-of-arbitration-andmediation.html [https://perma.cc/KY7X-FF7G].
48. Cap. 609, A137, § 98H.
49. Id. § 98Q(1)(b).
50. Id. § 98Q(1)(c).
51. Id. § 98Q(1)(e).
52. Id. § 98Q(1)(f).
53. Id. § 98Q(1)(g).
54. LEGIS. COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE BILLS COMMITTEE ON ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION
LEGISLATION (THIRD PATY FUNDING) (AMENDMENT), No. CB(4)1161/16-17, ¶ 8 (2016) (H.K.).
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concerning third-party funders that can help shape the ethical contours of
third-party funding in global dispute resolution.55
B.

ICCA Report Addresses the Ethical Issues Presented by Third-Party
Funders in International Arbitration

In 2013, the International Council for Commercial Arbitration (“ICCA”)
in collaboration with the Queen Mary College of the University of London
formed a Task Force to provide “greater understanding about what third-party
funding is and . . . the issues it raises in international arbitration.”56 In large
part, the Task Force came together to address the reality that litigation funders
were investing in international arbitration because such arbitrations were of
high value and offered little opportunity for appeal.57 Furthermore, there was
concern that funders are able to structure their funding agreements by
choosing choices of law and forums to avoid scrutiny of their investing
practices.58 In April 2018, the Task Force issued a Report on its findings.59
In order to accommodate “the range of existing third-party funding
models” and anticipate new developments, the Report adopted a broad
working definition of third-party funders and funding.60
55. See Singapore Civil Law Act (Chapter 43) Civil Law (Third-Party Funding) Regulations
2017, c. 43, § 68. The Singapore Law followed on the heels of the Hong Kong Law, as each center
tried to gain control of the international arbitration and mediation market. It is important to note
that Singapore, like Hong Kong, does not permit third-party funding in domestic Singaporean
courts. See Third Party Funding of Arbitration in Singapore and Hong Kong: A Comparison,
ASHURST (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.ashurst.com/en/news-and-insights/legal-updates/thirdparty-funding-of-arbitration-in-singapore-and-hong-kong-a-comparison/
[https://perma.cc/XQC3-UG7W].
56. ICCA REPORT, supra note 9, at 3; see also id. at 7 (describing the scope of the Task
Force’s work to include “analysis of specific issues that directly affect international arbitration
proceedings and are capable of being addressed at an international level (i.e., conflicts of interest,
privilege, and costs and security for costs)”).
57. See, e.g., id. at 4 (“Since the Task Force was initially constituted in 2013 . . . . The
funding market has expanded in several respects. The number of funded cases has increased
significantly. The number and geographic diversity of third-party funders has also increased, with
new entities continuing to enter the market and consequently increase the aggregate amounts
available for funding.”); see also id. at 25–27 (discussing the economics and return structures of
third-party funding).
58. See Rebecca Mulder & Marc Krestin, Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration:
To Regulate or Not to Regulate?, YOUNG ICCA BLOG (Dec. 18, 2017), http://www.youngiccablog.com/third-party-funding-in-international-arbitration-to-regulate-or-not-to-regulate/
[https://perma.cc/XW7A-73YJ].
59. ICCA REPORT, supra note 9, at i.
60. Id. at 50.
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The Report defines “third-party funding” as:
[A]n agreement by an entity that is not a party to the dispute to
provide a party, an affiliate of that party or a law firm representing
that party,
a) funds or other material support in order to finance part or all of
the cost of the proceedings, either individually or as part of a specific
range of cases, and
b) such support or financing is either provided in exchange for
remuneration or reimbursement that is wholly or partially dependent
on the outcome of the dispute, or provided through a grant or in
return for a premium payment.61

It goes on to define a third-party funder as:
[A]ny natural or legal person who is not a party to the dispute but
who enters into an agreement either with a party, an affiliate of that
party, or a law firm representing that party:
a) in order to provide material support for or to finance part or all of
the cost of the proceedings, either individually or as part of a specific
range of cases, and
b) such support or financing is either provided in exchange for
remuneration or reimbursement that is wholly or partially dependent
on the outcome of the dispute, or provided through a grant or in
return for a premium payment.62

In addition to the working definitions, the Task Force addressed four
ethical issues that are raised when third-party funders provide support in
international arbitration: (1) the potential conflicts of interest between the
arbitrator and third-party funder; (2) how sharing information with a thirdparty funder might affect the attorney-client privilege; (3) whether there is a
need for third-party funding to provide security for costs; and (4) how the
presence of a third-party funder affects the allocation of costs.63

61.
62.
63.

Id. See also id. at 56–70 for a survey of existing definitions.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 12.
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Conflicts of Interest Between the Arbitrator and Third-Party
Funder64

The Report recognizes that the international arbitration community has
become an insular club in which third-party funders, attorneys and arbitrators
have ongoing contact.65 Contributing to this insularity, attorneys on one case
may switch hats and serve as an arbitrator on another case.66 Adding to this
insularity, third-party funders are increasingly tapping experienced attorney
from this pool to work for the funders and serve on their advisory boards.67
Despite some disagreement, the Report proposed “systematic disclosure”
because “disclosure by the funded party of the existence and identity of
funders is necessary so that arbitrators [can] make appropriate disclosures
and decisions regarding potential conflicts of interest.”68 Accordingly, the
Report calls for parties to “disclose the existence of a third-party funding
arrangement and the identity of the funder to the arbitrator . . . as part of a
first appearance . . . or as soon as practicable.”69 This proposal is “in keeping
with global trends in regulation of third-party funding,” consistent with an
ICCA survey that found broad support for disclosure of third-party funding
arrangements and funders,70 and recognizes the many potential conflicts
between arbitrators and funders that could arise in several circumstances.71
Colleagues in the arbitrator’s law firm might be working with the third-party
funder on another matter.72 In another example, the arbitrator could be the
arbitrator on a case funded by the third-party funder, and then counsel on
another case funded by the same third-party funder.73 Without disclosure of
these conflicts, the arbitrator’s impartiality and commitment to maintaining
an international arbitration of integrity would be called into question.74

64. Id. at 63, 81–115 (discussing the revision of the International Bar Association (IBA)
Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest).
65. See id. at 82.
66. See Jennifer A. Trusz, Full Disclosure? Conflicts of Interest Arising from Third-Party
Funding in International Commercial Arbitration, 101 GEO. L.J. 1649, 1669–71 (2013).
67. ICCA REPORT, supra note 9, at 82.
68. Id. at 83.
69. Id. at 81.
70. Id. at 83.
71. Id. at 82.
72. See id. at 111.
73. Id. at 112.
74. See id. at 87.
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Confidentiality and Attorney Client-Privilege75

Prior to deciding to fund a case, third-party funders gather information
from the attorney and client to assess the viability of funding that case.76 Is
the sharing of that information done so in a way that waives the attorneyclient privilege or is it done so in a way that protects the attorney-client
privilege? As the Report notes, “[t]he rise of third-party funding has added
new complexities to existing ambiguities about privilege in international
arbitration.”77 The Report identifies three categories of information that
implicate these complexities.78 The first category is privileged information
that is provided to a third-party at the “initial due diligence phase”79 and after
it has committed to funding the party.80 The second category involves the
funding agreement itself.81 The final category includes documents produced
and held by the funder, such as the funder’s assessment of the case,
“documents relating to the negotiation of the funding agreement,” and legal
opinions on the strength of the case generated by the funder.82
The Report takes the position that the “existence of funding and the
identity of a third-party funder is not subject to any legal privilege.”83 The
specific provisions of a funding agreement, on the other hand, “may be
subject to confidentiality obligations . . . and may include information that is
subject to a legal privilege.”84 Production of these specific provisions should
be ordered by the arbitral tribunal only “in exceptional circumstances.”85
Finally, on the question of waiver, the Report states that the mere fact that
privileged information is furnished to a third-party funder should not waive
the privilege, so long as the information was provided “for the purpose of
obtaining funding or supporting the funding relationship.”86

75. Id. at 117.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 118.
78. Id. at 118–19.
79. Id. at 118. The Report describes that phase as “where funding is first requested and the
third-party funder requires information in order to decide whether or not to provide financing.”
Id.
80. Id. at 119.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 117.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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Allocation of Costs and Security of Costs87

The Report also examined how to respond to security of cost applications
at the beginning of the arbitration and applications for allocation of costs at
the end of the arbitration when one or both parties are funded by a third-party
funder.88
As mentioned in the introduction of this article, the global legal regimes
are different than the U.S. legal system. One glaring difference is that the
English rule requires the losing party in litigation to pay the winner’s
attorney’s fees, while the American rule followed in the United States
requires each party to be responsible for its respective legal fees.89 In
arbitration, however, arbitrators may award costs in a different proportion
than the “all or nothing” English rule would suggest.90 In another departure
from the distinction between the American and English rule, the Federal
Arbitration Act provides that U.S. domestic arbitrators may enforce
international arbitration awards that allocate costs in a manner different than
the American rule.91 Thus, some of the advances cannot be transported
wholesale because of these differences.
However, these initiatives can also generate ideas about what should be
included in U.S. ethical guidelines for dispute resolution providers and
neutrals. Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) providers and neutrals
should consider requiring disclosure of third-party funding of a party
participating in arbitration and mediation. Another consideration is what
information can be shared with the other party because the attorney-client
privilege has been waived and what information remains privileged. In
another example, the awarding of third-party funding costs as part of the
arbitration award may be one global practice that may be transported to the
United States and have ethical ramifications.92
87. Id. at 146.
88. Id.
89. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American Rule on
Attorney Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 327
(2013).
90. See Counting the Costs of Arbitration, BIRD & BIRD (Dec. 2005),
https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2005/counting-the-cost-of-arbitration
[https://perma.cc/7YYP-PWEG].
91. See 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2018).
92. See John Fellas, Can Arbitrators Award Third-Party Funding Costs in International
Arbitration?, N.Y. L.J. (June 30, 2017), https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/4b4d371e8751-4f20-8d3a-331c417074e4/?context=1000516 [https://perma.cc/ST4Q-TZ3T] (explaining
how cost-shifting, in which the arbitrator orders the losing party to pay the costs of the prevailing
party, is part of international arbitration. Litigation funding is now an included part of those costs.
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IN THE UNITED STATES, A SLOWER PULSE

In contrast to the welcome global embrace for third-party funders, the
United States has maintained an ambivalent and cautious approach towards
third-party funding. Domestically, U.S. courts have divided on the legality
of third-party funders.93 Some courts have abandoned barratry, champerty and
maintenance, while other courts still rely on these prohibitions to help define
permissible outsider conduct.94 To this day, courts still frown upon those
outsiders to litigation such as third-party funders who instigate, control,
fund, and profit from litigation to which they are not a party.95 The litigantjudge relationship remains sacrosanct.96 One reason proffered for the U.S.’s
hesitance about third-party funding is a long-held value that one shouldn’t
profit from another’s harm.97 This section will provide a snapshot of the
U.S.’s reaction by highlighting three spheres of influence that are shaping
the U.S.’s response to third-party funding: the courts, the American Bar
Association, and public interest groups such as the Rand Institute and the
U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform.
A.

Survey of Court Responses

The U.S. courts have had a range of responses to third-party funders from
acceptance,98 conditional acceptance,99 to outright rejection of the concept.100
Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc.101 is an instructive case that highlights the
layers of confidentiality issues raised by the presence of third-party funders.
As a threshold issue, the court found that litigation funding is legal in Illinois,
because the doctrines of maintenance and champerty “have been narrowed to
a filament.”102 Moreover, the purpose of the funding in the case at bar was
not “to promote strife or contention,” but to provide needed economic
backing to advance the party’s claim.103
Mr. Fellas posits that the Federal Arbitration Act could also be interpreted to mean that costs
include the cost of litigation funders.).
93. See ABA 20/20 REPORT, supra note 7, at 9–12; MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 3, at 11–
12, 129 (discussing contemporary U.S. domestic court responses to third-party funding).
94. See ABA 20/20 REPORT, supra note 7, at 11–12.
95. MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 3, at 23.
96. See id. at 10–11.
97. Id. at 23.
98. See ABA 20/20 REPORT, supra note 7, at 9–12.
99. See Justinian Capital SPC v. WestLB AG, 65 N.E.3d 1253, 1256 (N.Y. 2016).
100. See, e.g., Johnson v. Wright, 682 N.W.2d 671, 677–78 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
101. 17 F. Supp. 3d 711 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
102. Id. at 727.
103. Id. at 726.

51:0131] ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION

147

Instructive to our discussion, the court explained analogizing third-party
funding to insurance is an inaccurate comparison because litigation funding
and insurance each create distinct financial relationships: “Abraham Lincoln
once was asked how many legs a donkey has if you call its tail a leg. His
answer was four: calling a tail a leg does not make it one.”104 With insurance,
the relationship between insurer and insured is one of indemnification. The
insurance company, as the subrogee, is “limited to reimbursement for what it
paid its insured and no more.”105 In contradistinction, the relationship
between a litigation funder and the party it funds is limited by the amount of
funds the litigation funder has agreed to loan the fundee. The funder is not a
subrogee and will not pay for the fundee’s losses or indemnify the funder.106
The court also addressed whether privileged attorney-client information
shared with a third-party funder waived that confidentiality privilege or
remained privileged because the third-party funder shared a “common
interest in the successful outcome of the litigation.”107 The court opined the
sharing of information with litigation funders was not protected by the
common interest doctrine, because the relationship was about money, not
legal strategies or opinions.108 However, the court found that even though the
information shared with the third-party funder was not protected by the
“common interest” doctrine, it was protected by the confidentiality agreement
that was signed by the funder prior to receiving the privileged information.109
B.

ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20

The American Bar Association Commission on Ethics 20/20 Information
Report to the House of Delegates (the “ABA 20/20 Report”) focuses on how
the third-party funders might ethically compromise the attorney-client
relationship.110 The Commission cautioned about potential ethical threats to
lawyers’ professional responsibilities in three areas. First, the lawyer should
ensure that any third-party funding agreement or relationship does not
compromise or disincentivize the lawyer’s independent professional
judgment in the attorney-client relationship.111 Thus, lawyers should avoid
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 729.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 731–35.
Id. at 732–34.
See id. at 736–39.
ABA 20/20 REPORT, supra note 7, at 15–29.
Id. at 22.
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third-party funding agreements that attempt to overtake control of the case.112
Second, the lawyer should take care that when the client or lawyer share
privileged information protected by the attorney-client privilege with the
third-party funder, the lawyer should take steps to protect that
confidentiality.113 Third, the lawyer should have an adequate understanding
of how third-party funders work so that the lawyer may inform and counsel
the client about any potential risks associated working with funders.114
Of particular interest to dispute resolution neutrals, the Commission raised
that a contractual obligation with a third-party funder might influence a
party’s decision-making process regarding settlement.115 Some agreements
with third-party funders explicitly state that the funder has to approve the
settlement.116 Yet, even if the contractual agreement is silent on this point, the
funded party may “implicitly” consider the funded amount in assessing
whether the settlement number is adequate.117
The Commission recognized that because there are so many variations of
third-party funding agreements, it is challenging to identify all the possible
ethical issues for lawyers that may arise from these different permeations.118
Moreover, as third-party funders continue to evolve and offer different types
of financial support, new ethical challenges could emerge.119 The
Commission reinforced that the client, as a matter of agency law, has a right
to delegate revocable settlement authority to other agents such as a third-party
funder.120 However, any agreement with a third-party funder should not
interfere with a client’s option of terminating the lawyer-client relationship
at any time.121

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 21.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 27.
Id.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 16.
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Public Interest Research

The Rand Report—Third Party Litigation Funding122

In 2009, the UCLA-RAND Center for Law and Policy convened ThirdParty Litigation Funding and Claim Transfer: Trends and Implications for
the Civil Justice System (the “Rand Report”), the first U.S. symposium on
third-party funding.123 Bringing together representatives from the business,
legal, academic, and not-for-profit communities, the group investigated how
third-party funding will impact the civil justice system.124 The group did not
anticipate that third-party funders would provoke a rise in frivolous cases.125
Rather, the group concluded that more research was needed on whether thirdparty funders could use risk analysis to identify and support more meritorious
cases.126 The group discussed the ethical concerns raised by third-party
funders such as the confidentiality issues in the lawyer-client relationship.127
Participants expressed that there exists sufficient elasticity in the existing
ethical rules to accommodate these ethical concerns.128
In a noteworthy follow-up to the 2009 Rand Report, Steven Garber
examined the economic, legal, and ethical issues related to third-party
financing in the United States,129 in particular its possible effects on the
likelihood and timing of settlements.130 First, Garber recognizes that
disclosure of the mere existence of third-party funding may make the
defendant more inclined to settle.131 This is because “a defendant who knows
that the plaintiff has [funding] may infer from the existence of [such funding]
that the legal claim has legal merit or high economic value . . . .”132 Second,
122. The Rand Corporation is a non-profit research organization which “is dedicated to
making the civil justice system more efficient and more equitable.” Rand Institute for Civil
CORP.,
https://www.rand.org/jie/justice-policy/civil-justice.html
Justice,
RAND
[http://perma.cc/4YPC-QL87] (last visited Feb. 22, 2019).
123. MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 3, at 1.
124. Id. at iii.
125. Id. at 20.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 16.
128. Id. at 17.
129. See generally STEVEN GARBER, RAND CORP., ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING IN
THE UNITED STATES (2010), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/
2010/RAND_OP306.pdf [https://perma.cc/VK5V-BJEX].
130. Id. at 32.
131. Id.
132. Garber notes that this scenario is most plausible in the context of investments in
commercial claims, however, because third-party funders in this context have rigorous claimassessment procedures. Id. at 33.
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Garber reasons that “the existence of a non-recourse loan to a plaintiff could
impede settlements both early and late in the life of the underlying lawsuit,
but promote settlements during a period of time in between.”133
2.

The U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform134

The U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, a non-profit affiliate of the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce and an advocacy group to promote civil justice
reform, has taken on the issue of third-party funding.135 Unlike the Rand
Report, which offers a cautiously accepting approach to third-party funding,
the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform has been banging the drums and
warning that “the sky is falling” unless our legal system takes affirmative
steps to protect against the “parade of horribles” that third-party funders may
cause.136 The Chamber warns that unchecked, third-party funders will
promote frivolous litigation.137 In a passionate letter joined by over two dozen
other business organizations, the Chamber has also called for a revision of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to require that parties disclose in all civil
cases when they receive backing from third-party funders.138
Although the Civil Rules Committee has yet to revise the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the concerns raised by the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal
Reform have been heeded. On January 17, 2017, the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California required that parties in class actions must
disclose whether they are receiving funding.139 In an even bolder action, on
133. Id.
134. JOHN BEISNER ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SELLING LAWSUITS,
BUYING TROUBLE: THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES (Oct. 2009),
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/thirdpartylitigationfinancing.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7WUH-P4KZ].
CHAMBER
INST.
FOR
LEGAL
REFORM,
135. About
ILR,
U.S.
https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/about-ilr [https://perma.cc/9YQN-2J2C] (last visited
Feb. 24, 2018).
136. See BEISNER ET AL., supra note 134, at 4–5.
137. Id. at 5–7.
138. The Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure has considered such a proposed
amendment, once in 2014 and again in 2016. Memorandum from Hon. John D. Bates, Chair,
Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to Hon. David G. Campbell, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice
and Procedure (Dec. 6, 2017), in ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, AGENDA BOOK 235, 247–
51,
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2018-01-standing-agenda-book.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z5TJ-VMHF]. On both occasions, the committee concluded that the topic was
not “ripe.” Id. at 247.
139. See Standing Order for All Judges of the Northern District of California, Contents of
Joint Case Management Statement ¶ 19 (Nov. 1, 2018), https://cand.uscourts.gov/whaorders
[https://perma.cc/Q9EL-4KJF]; Memorandum from Patrick A. Tighe, supra note 1, at 211.
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April 3, 2018, Wisconsin enacted Wisconsin Act 235,140 becoming the first
state to require litigants in civil actions to disclose their litigation funding
agreements whether or not they are asked to do so.141 Then on April 10, 2018,
the Civil Rules Committee issued a 50-state survey regarding third partyfunding disclosure.142
Thus, even though the United States retains a cautionary approach to thirdparty funders, some states are recognizing the importance of disclosure and
are beginning to enact statutes and court rules compelling disclosure.143 The
U.S. courts, however, have yet to reach consensus on the legality of thirdparty funders. The not-for-profits groups who have researched how litigation
funders might impact litigation have focused their efforts on amplifying their
concerns about how third-party funding could potentially erode the fabric of
our justice system. However, while these well-intentioned organizations
continue to pontificate about their concerns regarding third-party funders, the
funders continue to participate in such dispute resolution processes as
mediation and arbitration, invisible and unregulated. The next Part
incorporates the expressed concern and advances the discussion by
suggesting affirmative steps that should be taken by dispute resolution
providers and neutrals to address the ethical concerns presented by third-party
funders’ participation in dispute resolution.
PROPOSED ETHICAL GUIDELINES AND BEST PRACTICES FOR U.S.
IV.
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROVIDERS, ARBITRATORS, AND MEDIATORS
In this Part, I offer ethical guidelines and best practice suggestions for
ADR providers,144 arbitrators, and mediators so that the dispute resolution
140. WIS. STAT. § 804.01(2)(bg) (2018).
141. Expectedly, supporters of disclosure applauded this legislation while litigation funders
voiced concerns that this legislation did not distinguish between disclosure requirements for
consumer and commercial cases. Jamie Hwang, Wisconsin Law Requires All Litigation Funding
Arrangements to Be Disclosed, A.B.A. J.: DAILY NEWS (Apr. 10, 2018, 10:45 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/wisconsin_law_requires_all_litigation_funding_arrang
ements_to_be_disclosed/ [https://perma.cc/3DMY-29XY]. While third-party funders have
accepted disclosure as part of international practice, third-party funders continue to push back
about efforts to require disclosure in the U.S. See, e.g., Mandatory Disclosure of Funders Would
Further Clog Overburdened Court Dockets, BENTHAM IMF (June 13, 2018),
https://www.benthamimf.com/blog/blog-full-post/bentham-imf-blog/2018/06/13/mandatorydisclosure-of-funders-would-further-clog-overburdened-court-dockets [https://perma.cc/G8PVULCT].
142. Tighe, supra note 1, at 209–29.
143. See id.
144. See generally CPR–GEORGETOWN COMM’N ON ETHICS AND STANDARDS OF PRACTICE
IN ADR, PRINCIPLES FOR ADR PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS (2002), https://www.cpradr.org/
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profession may more responsively address the real and apparent ethical
issues that arise when a third-party funder backs a party who is participating
in a dispute resolution procedure.145 The time has come for dispute
resolution providers and neutrals to acknowledge the reality of third-party
funding, take affirmative steps to maintain the integrity of dispute resolution
practices, and consider the potential benefits third- party funders bring to
settlement. Some observe and others ignore the reality that third-party
funders are proliferating and backing participating parties in our arbitrations
and mediations with greater frequency. This ignorance is untenable, for the
presence of third-party funders that provide financial backing to dispute
resolution parties may at times challenge the ethical obligations of dispute
resolution providers and neutrals.
An overarching interest of dispute resolution providers, arbitrators, and
mediators when parties are backed by third-party funders is to obtain
adequate relevant information about third-party funders so that ADR
professionals can ensure that the dispute resolution process and any resulting
settlement are procedurally and substantively fair and just.146 In order to
address this overarching interest, I offer three suggestions. First, dispute
resolution providers and neutrals should require titrated disclosure about
the relationship between the third-party funder and the party. Second,
neutrals must be educated about how to work with third-party funders when
they are backing any of the participating parties. Third, dispute resolution
intake procedures, promotional materials, contracting forms, and other
required paperwork need to be modified to gather relevant information about
the third-party funder. I first explain these general suggestions and then tailor
the application of each of these suggestions to the three different groups.

resource-center/protocols-guidelines/ethics-codes/principles-for-adr-provider-organizations/
_res/id=Attachments/index=0/Principles-for-ADR-Provider-Organizations.pdf
[https://perma.cc/958L-JSRT] for guidance on how ADR providers should provide quality
information about the services they provide to avoid ethical issues that would impugn the integrity
of the organization and the dispute resolution procedures it provides.
145. In this section, ADR providers include the courts as well as private providers. Litigants
may actually mediate or arbitrate their dispute in three different contexts. First, some litigants
may decide on their own to mediate or arbitrate their dispute once their legal dispute arises. In
those cases, the litigants may opt to select their own private arbitrators or mediators either through
a private ADR provider (administered process) or on their own. Second, the court may strongly
recommend that litigants mediate or arbitrate their dispute once a legal action is commenced.
Third, litigants may be obligated to mediate or arbitrate a dispute pursuant to contract.
146. The measures for fair and just are measured differently in arbitration and mediation. See
Judith L. Maute, Public Values and Private Justice: A Case for Mediator Accountability, 4 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 503, 504–05 (1991).
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Proposal One: Titrated and Sequential Disclosure About the
Relationship Between the Third-Party Funder and Party

Disclosure remains a hotly contested and nuanced issue in which thirdparty funders tenaciously advocate for confidentiality of their contracting
relationship with the party while those purveyors of justice, many untrusting
of third-party funders, are demanding disclosure so that there is total
transparency. Disclosure is not an all or nothing proposition; rather, it is a
nuanced term that embraces what is disclosed, to whom disclosure is made,
whether the information disclosed remains confidential, and at what phase of
the dispute resolution procedure the information is to be disclosed.
Acknowledging the apprehensions raised by third-party funders about
disclosure and the dispute resolution profession’s need for quality disclosure
about third-party funders, I recommend that disclosure should be sequentially
titrated and tailored to the different phases of the dispute resolution
procedures. The information that is required to be disclosed should be based
on the informational needs warranted at different phases of the given dispute
resolution procedure. Moreover, such sequential, titrated disclosure helps
avoid broad disclosure about the third-party funder in those instances when
parties are not going forward with the dispute resolution procedure, or the
information is not necessary.
1.
a.

Three Levels of Sequential Disclosure During the Contracting
Phase of Arbitration and the Pre-Mediation Phase

Recommended Disclosure Level One

In the initial contracting phase between a party and the dispute
resolution provider, arbitrator or mediator, disclosure about third-party
funders should be limited to whether or not there is a third-party funder, and
if there is, the names of those in the funder’s organization. The rationale for
disclosing the identity of the third-party funder is to ferret out early on in the
dispute resolution process any potential conflicts that may exist between the
third-party funder and the neutral.147
If there is a conflict, an ancillary issue that needs to be addressed at this
phase is whether the conflict between the third-party funder and the neutral is
a waivable one that first needs to be disclosed to the other party or is deemed
to be a conflict that is not waivable. If those involved want the opportunity
to waive the conflict, the identity and relationship of the funder must also
147. See ICCA REPORT, supra note 9, at 87.
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be shared with the other party involved in the matter. Identifying conflicts
doesn’t necessarily mean disqualification. Customarily, when there is a
conflict, conflicts can be waived at the consent of the parties.148 Dispute
resolution providers and neutrals can incorporate this level of disclosure into
the existing conflict procedures used.
Another option is for dispute resolution providers to institute a per se rule
that conflicts between the neutral and third-party funders cannot be waived.
In that case, the identity of the third-party funder does not have to be
disclosed. Dispute resolution professionals and providers have to decide on
the rule they will choose to incorporate as part of their practice, and then
notify parties about this rule.
I offer a cautionary note about considering the second option and
instituting a per se ban on waiving conflicts. While some dispute resolution
communities are large and have many dispute resolution professionals from
which to select a neutral, some dispute resolution practice communities are
insular and just have a finite number of neutrals. In those instances, it is
common that arbitrations and mediations involve the same people, just
wearing different hats. In those cases, neutrals and providers may want to
consider the ramifications of making conflicts between neutrals and thirdparty funders conflicts that can’t be waived.
b.

Recommended Disclosure Level Two

Once conflicts between the third-party funder and neutral are addressed
and it is decided that the parties wish to proceed with the dispute resolution
procedure, an additional level of disclosure that clarifies the relationship
between the third-party funder and participant needs to be made at the
contracting phase. The importance of such disclosure is to allow the dispute
resolution provider, arbitrator, and mediator to discern if the third-party
funder is actually a party to the dispute resolution procedure. Of course,
determining whether or not a funder is a party is controversial and is a label
that third-party funders prefer to avoid.149 However, our primary concern
is to maintain the integrity of our dispute resolution procedures. Therefore,
dispute resolution providers, arbitrators, and mediators must have knowledge
of all the parties who are influencing and shaping the resolution of the
dispute.
If the third-party funder is a party, then what is its level of participation in
the dispute resolution procedure and the concomitant obligations that come
148. See id. at 81–115.
149. NIEUWVELD & SAHANI, supra note 1, at 47–48 discusses whether third-party funding is
characterized as a loan subjecting it to usury laws versus a loan.
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with that participation? For example, if the third-party funder is funding a
party in mediation, shouldn’t that third-party funder also be required to sign a
confidentiality agreement protecting the confidentiality of mediation
communications? In another example, if a party is to proceed to agreement
and the party’s funding agreement shows that the third-party funder is
actually now a party, should the third-party funder be required to participate
in the arbitration?
i) Disclosure raises concomitant confidentiality issues if the third-party
funder participates in mediation and arbitration.
An important sub-issue that should also be addressed when clarifying the
relationship between the third-party funder and the party is clarifying which
information that the lawyer and party shared with the third-party funder
remains confidential as part of the attorney-client privilege and which
information was shared in a way that waives the privilege. Whether or not the
information that is shared with a third-party funder is done so in a way that
waives or protects the attorney-client privilege has procedural implications
in mediation and procedural and evidentiary implications in arbitration.
When it is disclosed that a third-party funder is backing a mediation party,
that relationship raises three issues about mediation confidentiality that
dispute resolution professionals need to address to preserve the integrity of
mediation. A threshold issue that dispute resolution professionals need to
clarify is how the third-party funder should be characterized. This
professional characterization is important, because depending on the
characterization of the third-party funder, different confidentiality concerns
have to be resolved. For example, if a third-party funder learns in the course
of a mediation confidential information about the other party that could give
the third-party funder a trading advantage, the third-party funder should be
barred from trading on that information. The second issue to be addressed is
whether the dispute resolution party will communicate with the funder about
mediation communications, and because there is an expectation by all
mediation participants that the mediation communications are to remain
confidential, should the third-party funder be compelled to also sign a
confidentiality agreement or should the confidentiality agreement be
amended so that it allows the dispute resolution party to consult with the
third-party funders as one of its experts? So in mediation, if the participating
party has a contractual relationship with the third-party funder that requires
sharing of information, consultation, and direction as the case progresses,
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then the mediator should also have the third-party funder sign a
confidentiality agreement to protect mediation confidentiality.150
If the third-party funder happens to also be a hedge fund, extra mediation
confidentiality protections are needed to protect mediation confidentiality
and prevent insider training. We learn from bankruptcy mediations in which
hedge funds participate that added ethical screens/walls are needed to secure
the mediation communications.151 Another wrinkle that dispute resolution
professionals need to address is that hedge funds that are also third-party
funders might learn confidential information in the mediation about the other
party that the hedge fund uses to trade on.152
Unlike mediation, in arbitration, the arbitrator makes determinations
and issues awards based on the evidence presented.153 Therefore, it is
important to ascertain whether information shared with the third-party funder
is done so in a way that protects or waives the attorney-client privilege.
c.

Recommended Disclosure Level Three

A third level of disclosure that may be necessary is the financial
relationship between the third-party funder and the funded party. Although
this information may be needed in both arbitration and mediation, the
information is needed in each dispute resolution procedure for different
reasons. In arbitration, the information may be needed either to assess the
costs one party incurred to go forward with the arbitration or to ensure that
the third-party funder has sufficient funds to follow-through on his funding
obligations. The decision about when this disclosure should take place is
context specific. For example, if the other party makes a motion at the
beginning of the arbitration for a bond of sufficiency, then that information
needs to be provided at the beginning of the arbitration process. However, if
no such motion is made, then the request for such information might not be
made until the end of the arbitration when the neutral needs to be informed
150. See id. at 154, stating that Indiana, Nebraska and Vermont are states who have enacted
legislation providing that the attorney-client privilege includes sharing privileged work product
and communication with third-party litigation funders.
151. See Charles Duhigg & Peter Lattman, Judge Says Hedge Funds May Have Used Inside
Information, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Sept. 14, 2011, 9:28 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2011/09/14/judge-says-hedge-funds-may-have-used-inside-information/
[https://perma.cc/UX9B-2UKV].
152. See GM Judge Aims to Prevent Insider Trading by Distressed Debt Funds, REUTERS
(July
15,
2013),
https://www.reuters.com/article/idUS162810420130715
[https://perma.cc/DXM4-WYTJ].
153. Comparison Between Arbitration & Mediation, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY,
https://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/comparison-between-arbitration-mediation
[https://perma.cc/94Y3-R8EM] (last visited Mar. 3, 2019).
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about the actual costs, including the cost of third-party funding, that the party
has incurred.154
In mediation, the information might be helpful to assess each party’s
commitment to yield a just result or to better understand the economics of a
party’s decision or ambivalence about settlement. Here again, the timing of
the disclosure will be based on when this informational need arises. As one
illustration, if a party needs to reimburse a third-party funder the borrowed
amount, interest on that amount and an exponential return on any amount
recovered, the party may be reluctant to accept what appears to the mediator,
a reasonable settlement. Only when the party discloses the financial
obligations to the funder might a mediator better understand the impasse
and be able work with the parties in a more realistic way.
d.

Recommended Disclosure Level Four

A fourth level of disclosure is the sharing of the third-party funder’s
objective assessment of the case. Because of their ability to create a matrix
of information about the merits of the case with admirable objectivity, thirdparty funders are often considered to be super lawyers. Like other experts
that are often part of arbitration and mediation processes, funders can be
invited to share their analysis of the case, to provide evidence in the arbitration
or to help address impasses in mediation. To date, third-party funders have
resisted sharing their analysis of a case, insisting that their method of
assessing whether a case is investment worthy is proprietary, and not to be
shared with others. Going forward, however, as the push for greater
transparency on the part of third-party funders gains momentum, dispute
resolution professionals will have to work with third-party funders, as they
work with other experts, to have third-party funders share their case analysis
without disclosing all their proprietary methods.
B.

Proposal Two: Training for ADR Providers, Arbitrators, and
Mediators

Professional dispute resolution training programs should be expanded
to include education about the additional skills neutrals need to work with
those parties backed by third-party funders. As was mentioned in the
introduction of this paper, many dispute resolution professionals and
providers are unaware that parties are backed by third-party funders even
though increasing numbers of parties are receiving dispute funding. Yet, as
154. See ICCA REPORT, supra note 9, at 146.
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this article has explained, such unawareness is creating an ethical minefield
that potentially undermines the integrity of dispute resolution. Thus, a
specialized training module is needed to heighten a neutral’s awareness about
third-party funders and to provide neutrals with the requisite skills needed to
maintain a dispute resolution process of integrity.
The contents of such an additional training module should include the
ethical issues that neutrals need to address when parties are funded; how to
modify intake and process procedures to ferret out the existence of thirdparty funders; how to implement titrated levels of disclosure; strategies to
help neutrals manage their own cognitive biases about third-party funders;
how to incorporate the third-party funder’s assessment of the case into the
process; and skills to manage parties’ own biases about third-party funders.
At this time, those ADR providers and trainers who are ahead of the curve
and wish to develop a responsive training for neutrals will find more
questions raised than answers provided. The scholarship surrounding thirdparty funding, to date, has centered on the ethics of the practice and the
question of disclosure. The specifics of how disclosure of third-party funders
might actually influence the dynamics with the neutral and participants,
however, remain an unexplored area. In Part V of this paper, I raise these
emerging questions and posit the possible dynamic shifts that third-party
funders might spark arbitration and mediation.
V.

HOW MIGHT DISCLOSURE IMPACT THE DYNAMICS OF THE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PROCESS

Once one or both parties disclose that they are receiving dispute funding,
any conflicts emerging from that disclosure are addressed, and the dispute
resolution process proceeds, the disclosure itself could also potentially
shape the decision-making process of the neutrals and parties involved.
Although there is no specific research on point, cognitive psychologists
provide us with insights about how arbitrators, mediators, and disputants
might be influenced by the knowledge that a dispute is receiving third-party
funding. 155 Biases about third-party funding, the amount of funding that a
party is receiving, and the terms of the funding agreement may all influence
the dynamics in both arbitration and mediation.

155. See generally MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN
BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE (2013); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974).
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Explicit and Implicit Bias About Third-Party Funding

Even though arbitrators and mediators are ethically mandated to be
impartial,156 they are also human beings who may have pre-existing ideas
about the ethics of third-party funding. These pre-existing ideas or biases
may cause the neutral to be explicitly or implicitly biased for or against thirdparty funders.157 As with many biases, such bias could be formed and
reinforced by the self-selected media and publications that the neutral has
been exposed to about third-party funders.158 For example, if a neutral is
following the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform’s concerted efforts
to disallow third-party funders from operating “in the shadows,” the neutral
might be leery of funders.159 However, if a neutral is enthusiastically
following the success of hedge funds who are funding litigation, then the
neutral might view funders more favorably.
Such biases, whether explicit or implicit, favorable or unfavorable,
might influence how neutrals deviate from their ethical mandate of
impartiality. Depending on the bias of the neutral, the neutral might then
interpret the fact that a party is funded as an indication that the case at hand
has enough merit to warrant investment or just an indication that the party
needed money. Depending on the bias of the neutral, the neutral may
consider the fact that a party is funded either as an indication of the level of
commitment of the parties to go forward with the case or a vengeful step to
drag the case on unnecessarily.
Cognitive psychologists explain that our biases are more likely to emerge
in ambiguous situations where there are fewer rules to follow.160 Thus, even
though mediators and arbitrators might both be influenced by their biases
about third-party funders, mediators might be more likely to be influenced
by such bias.161 The structure of the mediation process is more flexible and
156. See, e.g., CPR–GEORGETOWN COMM’N ON ETHICS AND STANDARDS OF PRACTICE IN
ADR, supra note 144, at 10 (“The ADR Provider Organization has an obligation to ensure that
ADR processes provided under its auspices are fundamentally fair and conducted in an impartial
manner.”).
157. Jean-Christophe Honlet, Recent Decisions on Third-Party Funding in Investment
Arbitration, 30 ICSID REV.–FOREIGN INV. L.J. 699, 699–712 (2015) (citing a case in which
arbitrator Dr. Gavin Griffith Q.C. was unsuccessfully challenged because of the negative views
he expressed about third-party funders).
158. BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 155, at 164; see also DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY
IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 201–23 (Harper Perennial ed.
2010) (2008).
159. See BEISNER ET AL., supra note 134.
160. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 155, at 1124.
161. See e.g., Gilat J. Bachar & Deborah R. Hensler, Does Alternative Dispute Resolution
Facilitate Prejudice and Bias? We Still Don’t Know, 70 SMU L. REV. 817, 821–22 (2017); see
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has less defined procedures than the arbitration process. For example,
mediation may be conducted in joint meetings, private caucuses, or a
combination of the two. Although the mediation parties, not the mediator,
have the ultimate decision-making power, the mediator, in his role as a
neutral, has greater discretion than an arbitrator about how to engage with
the parties and influence the contours of the agreement the parties will reach.
On a subtler level, the dollar amount of the funding agreement might also
unconsciously influence both the arbitrator’s and mediator’s shaping of a fair
and just resolution. Cognitive psychologists educate about the power of
anchoring, the undue influence that an initial number is given in subsequent
decision making.162 Thus, allocations of costs in arbitration and an acceptable
settlement number might be unduly influenced by the amount of funding one
or both parties are receiving. Might an arbitrator be influenced in making an
award by the fact that one party has received a significant amount of backing
by a third-party funder? Alternatively, if a defendant received a significant
amount of backing by a third-party funder, might the arbitrator have greater
sympathies for that defendant if the arbitrator issues an award that orders the
defendant to pay for damages and costs? In mediation, how might the
amount of the funding arrangements of the participants shape the mediator’s
prodding of a reasonable settlement?
Another yet unexplored issue is how, from the party’s perspective, a
party receiving funding calculates settlement decisions.163 In part, the
answer to this is likely based on the type of funding agreement that exists
between a party and the funder. If a party has a recourse funding agreement
in which the party is obligated to repay the funder for the borrowed money
plus interest, it is reasonable to assume that such a financial obligation would
be a consideration in the party assessing what a reasonable settlement would
be. Might a party receiving an apology as part of that settlement might then
devalue that apology if the party also has to repay the funder the borrowed
money? Possibly, if a party has a nonrecourse loan, and doesn’t have to repay
the funder unless the party is victorious, the party may feel more empowered
to proceed to judgment unless the settlement offer is as high as the expected
litigated value.
also Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1400–04; Trina Grillo, The Mediation
Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1587–94 (1991).
162. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 155, at 1129.
163. ROBERT H. MNOOKIM, SCOTT R. PEPPET & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO, BEYOND WINNING:
NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEAL DISPUTES 112–13, 117–18 (2000) (describing how
transaction costs can either deter or expedite settlement).
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Of course, disputants may have their own biases about third-party funders.
If the disputant believes that third-party funders only back cases of merit, the
disputant may be more inclined to settle once the disputant learns that the
other party is receiving dispute funding.164 However, if a disputant believes
third-party funders are unethical scammers, the disputant may become less
likely to settle and more determined to pursue her claim to vindication once
the disputant learns the opposing side is receiving dispute funding.
Although this is an uncharted area, these are issues that dispute resolution
professionals should be considering as they more actively engage with
participants and the third-party funders who back them. Of course, neutrals
need to become self-aware of their biases about third-party funders, along
with all their other biases, so that the bias does not adversely influence the
dispute resolution process. Such heightened awareness extends beyond the
initial disclosure to see if there is a conflict with the neutral. Such heightened
awareness extends throughout the mediation and arbitration.
B.

Proposal Three: Modification of Dispute Resolution Forms and
Procedures that Acknowledge the Possibility of Third-Party Funders

One way to change the status quo practice of “don’t ask, don’t tell” that
has allowed dispute resolution professionals to be unaware of the existence of
third-party funders is to modify dispute resolution forms and procedures to
actually ask if there is a third-party funder involved in the case. Dispute
resolution forms and procedures should be modified to reflect an awareness
that third-party funders may be backing one of the parties. For example, ADR
providers’ promotional materials, published rules and procedures could
provide that experts, including third-party funders, may have a role in the
given dispute resolution procedure. As mentioned above, dispute resolution
professionals may include such a query as a regular part of their intake and
contracting procedures.
CONCLUSION
The invisible practice of third-party funding is becoming increasingly
visible. The time has come for dispute resolution providers and neutrals to see
what they have yet to see before:165 Third-party funders are shaping the
practice of civil dispute resolution. Whether you believe this is an economic
reality needed to address the escalating costs of conflict resolution or an evil
164. See GARBER, supra note 129, at 32.
165. Mark 4:9 (NAB) (“Whoever has ears to hear ought to hear.”).
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that will erode our justice system, the dispute resolution profession must take
affirmative steps to address the real and apparent ethical collisions between
third-party funders and neutrals. This paper proposes ethical guidelines and
best practices that provide for modification of dispute resolution providers’
intake procedures, titrated disclosure of third-party funders, and training of
neutrals. The goal is to help respond to the conflict and confidentiality
concerns raised when third-party funders provide support for a party in
arbitration or mediation.
This paper also appreciates that we are in the dawn of awareness about
third-party funders. As a profession, it is challenging to speculate about what
we don’t know, but we must try.166 Going forward, we will benefit from
empirical research that clarifies how third-party funding shapes parties’
decision-making about settlement. And of course, the looming overarching
question is how third-party funders will influence the delivery of justice. This
paper invites dispute resolution providers and neutrals to rethink their current
practices, adapt, and work to create practices and guidelines that protect the
integrity of the dispute resolution profession and the justice it provides.

166. “Change is the law of life and those who look only in the past or present are certain to
miss the future.” John F. Kennedy, President of the U.S., Address in the Assembly Hall at the
Paulskirche in Frankfurt (June 25, 1963).

